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SUBSIDIZING ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY
© 2012 Maxwell S. Bayman
After Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 1 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission experienced a flood of applicants seeking construction and operating licenses to build
modern nuclear power plants. The legislative purpose of the Act is to promote the development
of cleaner forms of energy.

By the time the act became effective, it had been over thirty years

since the last application was filed. The Act provides, inter alia, a federal subsidy in the form of
a production tax credit for “advanced nuclear facilities.”2 At first, it appeared the credit could be
extremely valuable; however, built-in limitations and complex requirements reduced the value of
the credit for each new applicant. Unfortunately, the credit does not apply to applicants filing after 2008.

Since then, only one new application for a Construction and Operating License has

been filed, and the industry’s interest in advanced nuclear energy continues to remain substantially diminished.

For nuclear tax subsidies to be effective, they must have the power to reduce

or remove the high-risk barriers precluding investment in modern nuclear power plants. The legislative goals of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 cannot be given effect if the subsidies it provides
progressively decrease to a nominal value.
The first part of this paper reviews the historical development of nuclear energy and
compares nuclear energy to the other alternative sources of energy production. Part II discusses
the process of planning, building, and operating a nuclear facility and the tax consequences of
each stage.
1
2

Part III reviews and critiques the production tax credit for advanced nuclear facili-

Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
Id. § 1306.

ties.

Finally, Part IV considers alternative tax-based solutions to promote nuclear energy through

changes to corporate tax brackets and amendments to the credit system.
I. Historical Development of Nuclear Energy; Alternative Sources of Production
A. Overview of Current Electricity Paradigm
Innovations in modern technology occur every day, making electronic devices increasingly accessible to the general public.

The effects of cell phones, laptop computers, televisions,

and automated home electronics permeate all levels of our society. 3 The modern technological
age continues to expand the process of globalization, from connecting individuals a world apart,
to improving healthcare in rural areas.

None of these advancements would be possible without

electricity.
For the fifteen-year period beginning from 1997 to 2012, electricity usage in the U.S. increased 17.5%. 4

The need for electricity will continue to grow as our population increases in

size, and innovations in modern technology change the way we live our lives.
electricity increases, so too must our ability to generate power.

As demand for

There are significant environ-

mental implications related to the method by which power companies meet new demands. Modern power plants must reduce carbon emissions and decrease the energy industry’s adverse impact on the environment.

This would entail a significant departure from our current energy ar-

rangement, which relies heavily on coal and natural gas.
3

The question becomes how to achieve

In extreme cases, countries have taken defensive military action based on inaccurate representations of borderlines
on Google Maps. Jenny Schlesinger, Google Nearly Starts a War. Seriously, ABC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2010, 12:43
p.m.), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/11/google-nearly-starts-a-war-seriously/. Users of Facebook, an
online networking website, planned and effectuated the overthrow of a dictatorial government. Wilson Rothman,
How the Internet Brought Down a Dictator, NBCNEWS.COM TECHNOLOGY, http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/
technolog/how-internet-brought-down-dictator-125222 (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). Even relationships end due to
arguments between couples over the amount of time spent on the internet. Jennifer Aniston Ended Relationship with
John Mayer Because of His Twitter ‘Obsession’, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ technology/twitter/5038203/Jennifer-Aniston-ended-relationship-with-John-Mayer-because-of-his-Twitter-obsession.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
4
U.S. ENERGY INFO. A DMIN., M ONT HLY ENERGY REVIEW tbl. 7.2a, at 95 (Dec. 2012) (Electricity Net Generation:
Total (All Sectors)), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7_5.pdf.
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these environmental goals, while meeting the production level requisite to satisfy growing demand.

Yet, the industry is slow to respond to environmentally friendly alternatives.

A market

for cleaner alternative sources will emerge when the demand for electricity exceeds our national
generating capacity, and proper federal subsidies are in place.

Under those circumstances, nu-

clear power may become the new leader in production for modern electricity.

5

Nuclear power is a safe, clean, and efficient form of energy. 6 It is capable of satisfying
the increasing demand for electricity as well as significantly reducing carbon emissions compared to coal and natural gas powered facilities. 7 Today, there are 104 nuclear reactors “operating in the U.S., [which] are among . . . [the] safest . . . industrial facilities” in the nation. 8 The
carbon footprint of nuclear power is comparable to that of renewable generation sources. 9 The
operating life of a nuclear power plant is around forty years.

In some cases, new operating li-

censes allow existing plants to extend their operating life by another twenty years. 10 Additionally, the average nuclear power plant has the ability to operate at 90% of its deemed “nameplate
capacity.”11
Unfortunately, many barriers prevent investors from pursuing modern nuclear development.

The cost of preparing and filing an application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

5

But cf. Denis Binder, NEPA, NIMBYs and New Technology, 25 LAND & W AT ER L. REV. 11, 40 (1990) (“There has
always been a substantial body of opposition to nuclear power.”).
6
See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World, 34 W M. & M ARY ENVT L. L. & POL'Y
REV. 821, 883 (2010) (noting that nuclear energy plants produce no conventional air pollutants or emissions).
7
See Katarina O. Savino, The Case for Nuclear Power Tax Incentives, 123 TAX NOT ES 329 (2009), available at
2009 TNT 74-8 (LEXIS).
8
, Financial Stimulus to Nuclear Energy Industry Will Promote Job Creation, Industry Official Testifies, TAX NOT ES
TODAY (Nov. 10, 2009), available at 2009 TNT 216-38 (LEXIS) (testimony of Carol L. Berrigan to the U.S. Senate
Finance Committee). None of these facilities are eligible for the production tax credit created by the EPA-2005,
since all were placed in service before 1993.
9
Id.
10
Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVT L. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 231 (2005).
11
Gary L. Hunt & George Given, America's Resource Mix, PUB. UT IL. FORT ., 9-10 (July 2006),
http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2006/07/americas-resource-mix/page/0/1 (discussing historic output for nuclear power plants in the early 2000s). “The ‘nameplate capacity‘ of a reactor is its maximum rated output, which
may be expressed in GW per hour, and is usually indicated on a nameplate physically attached to the reactor.” Alan
S. Lederman, How Powerful Is the Nuclear Reactor Income Tax Credit?, 114 J. TAX. 100 (2011).
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(NRC) for a Construction and Operating License (COL) is expensive and time-consuming.
Where the application for a COL is successful, investors will then face the daunting task of
building the facility.

Although unexpected costs incurred during the construction phase of nu-

clear facilities are expected to decrease as reactor designs are streamlined, 12 the facility’s construction may be riddled with unexpected costs, design failures, lengthy inspections, and economic downturn that may result in the loss of financing. 13

Without congressional policies that

control or reduce the significant investment risks associated with the construction of modern nuclear power plants, development will continue at a turtle’s pace. 14 Thus, the nuclear industry is
not likely to expand without significant federal support. 15
B. History and Development of Nuclear Energy
1. Historical Overview
The history of atomic energy dates back to World War II and the Manhattan Project. 16
After World War II, the future of atomic power was somewhat uncertain. Some scientists saw a
new opportunity to use atomic power as a commercial energy source. 17

However, the Atomic

Energy Act of 1946 18 prohibited private development of atomic energy. 19 The Act’s prohibition

12

Robert Zuppert, Nuclear Power Standardization, ST RAT EGIC ST ANDARDS EDUC., 11, http://www. strategicstandards.com/files/NuclearEnergy.pdf(last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
13
Duke Raises Cost Estimate for Lee Plant, W ORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.world-nuclearnews.org/NN-Duke_raises_cost_estimate_for_Lee_plant-0711084.html (reporting that Duke Energy incurred $70
million in pre-construction costs in 2007 and estimating an additional $160 million in pre-construction costs for the
two-year period beginning in 2008).
14
Joseph P. Tomain & Constance Dowd Burton, Nuclear Transition: From Three Mile Island to Chernobyl, 28 W M.
& M ARY L. REV. 363, 364 (1987).
15
The U.S. government began taking steps to reduce the financial and administrative burdens that preclude or inhibit
nuclear power plant development. Some help came with the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Energy
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. The Act confirmed Congress’ plan to provide the needed support
to encourage the revitalization of nuclear energy.
16
Arthur W. Murphy & D. Bruce La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy
Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 394-95 (1976).
17
See Sonny Swazo, Casenote, The Future of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal, State Sovereignty and the Tenth
Amendment: Nevada v. Watkins, 36 NAT . RESOURCES J. 127, 129 (1996) (“To better serve the national interest,
Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 to further private sector nuclear energy development for
peaceful purposes . . . .”
18
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755.
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on private development stemmed from well-founded apprehensions related to the perceived destructive power of radioactive materials and the fear that commercial development could affect
the environment as well as public health. 20

Within a few years, the industry’s successful lobby-

ing efforts led to the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 21 The Act enabled the private
sector to invest in and develop commercial uses for atomic energy. 22
2. Commercialization of Atomic Energy
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provided the federal support needed to facilitate the private development of commercial nuclear power. 23

However, the liabilities associated with pri-

vate development were too risky for the industry to bear without government support; investors
were understandably reluctant to “proceed with a cloud of bankruptcy hanging over [their]
head[s].”24

In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act of 1957. 25

The Act largely limited the liability of utility providers upon the occurrence of a major accident. 26 As a result, entrepreneurs and major utility companies began the widespread construction
of commercialized nuclear power plants from 1957 through the mid-1960s. 27

This period was

known as the “Great Band Wagon Market” for nuclear energy. 28

19

Tomain, supra note 10, at 227.
Allen R. Ferguson, Jr., Comment, Federal Supremacy Versus Legitimate State Interests in Nuclear Regulation:
Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood, 33 CAT H. U. L. REV. 899, 899-900 (1984).
21
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919.
22
Joel Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 508 (1981); see also Tomain, supra note 10, at 227 (stating that the 1954 Act is the backdrop for our current regulatory scheme).
23
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 194 (1983).
24
See Tomain, supra note 10, at 228 (citing U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER: HIST ORICAL PERSPECT IVE, CURRENT ST AT UES, AND OUT LOOK 6 (DOE/EIA-0315, Mar. 1982).
25
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576.
26
Diane Carter Maleson, The Historical Roots of the Legal System's Response to Nuclear Power, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
597, 602 (1982).
27
See Tomain, supra note 10, at 228 (citing U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, supra 24).
28
Id.
20
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Despite an initially promising inception, the Great Band Wagon Market slowed and eventually froze by the mid-1970s. 29

From 1978 to 2008, no new Construction and Operating Li-

censes (COLs) were approved. 30 Reasons for the thirty-year lull in development include: (1) unexpected and excessive capital costs in designing, building, and operating nuclear facilities; 31
(2) public safety concerns soaring after the partial-meltdown of Pennsylvania’s Three-Mile Island plant in March of 1979 and the disastrous meltdown of Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union in April of 1986 32 ; and (3) innovative development of competing sources of energy such as
natural gas and renewable sources.
In 2005, the passage of the Energy Policy Act (EPA-2005) revived interest in nuclear energy, and ushered in what some have dubbed the “Nuclear Renaissance.”33 The EPA-2005 provides incentives for the development of advanced nuclear power plants such as production tax
credits, "a loan guarantee program, and regulatory risk insurance.”34 By the end of 2008, sixteen
new applications—proposing twenty-four nuclear reactors—were filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 35

Unfortunately, the EPA-2005 only sparked interest in advanced nuclear

power for a short period of time. 36

29

See Maleson, supra note 26, at 618 (noting the rapid rate of applications and construction for new nuclear facilities, followed by a sudden marked decline in the 1970s).
30
The last construction permit for a nuclear power plant was issued in 1978 and the last operating license was issued
in 1996. On February 9, 2012, the NRC approved its first COL in thirty years. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Approves Construction of First Nuclear Units in 30 Years, U.S. ENERGY INFO. A DMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (Mar. 5,
2012), http://205.254.135.7/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5250.
31
See Melissa Powers, The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and the End of Coal as a Source of Cheap Electricity, 12
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 407, 409 (2010) (noting that construction costs for nuclear reactors skyrocketed in the 1970s).
32
See T.L. Fahring, Note, Nuclear Uncertainty: A Look at the Uncertainties of A U.S. Nuclear Renaissance, 41 TEX.
ENVT L. L.J. 279, 288 (2011) (“Actual nuclear accidents in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly those at Browns Ferry,
Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl, did little to reassure the public.”)
33
Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Current "Nuclear Renaissance" in the United States, Its Underlying Reasons, and Its Potential Pitfalls, 29 Energy L.J. 279, 281 (2008).
34
Sony Ben-Moshe et al., Financing the Nuclear Renaissance: The Benefits and Potential Pitfalls of Federal &
State Government Subsidies and the Future of Nuclear Power in California, 30 ENERGY L.J. 497, 514 (2009).
35
See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications], available at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/newlicensing-files/expected-new-rx-applications.pdf.
36
Id. Since 2008, only one new application for two new reactors was submitted and six reactors were suspended. Id.
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3. How Nuclear Power Works
The commercial generation of electricity is largely based on Michael Faraday’s principle
of electromagnetic induction. 37

Electromagnetic induction converts mechanical energy into elec-

tricity by using an external force to rotate a conductor, such as copper wire, in a magnetic field. 38
Modern generators accomplish the same task but on a much larger scale.

In lieu of Faraday’s

hand-crank, most modern generators consist of a turbine connected to a large magnet surrounded
by coiled wires. 39

For decades, scientists continued to develop different ways to produce the

mechanical energy needed to continuously rotate these turbines.

Coal, natural gas, atomic ener-

gy, petroleum, solar, and hydro-power are among the methods in use today. 40
Atomic energy harnesses the immense power of nuclear fission to create heat. 41 The heat
generated from a nuclear reactor is used to produce steam from water. The steam then provides
the mechanical energy needed to rotate the turbine of a generator. The fission process originates
in the core of the nuclear reactor, where rods containing uranium pellets interact with neutrons
that force the uranium atoms to split, resulting in a significant release of energy in the form of

37

Joshua J. Houser, Note, Supplying the Light at the End of the Tunnel: Using State-Level Experience to Develop
Federal-Level Renewable Energy Policy, 19 SOUT HEAST ERN ENVT L. L.J. 153, 157 (2010).
38
Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 885 (2011).
39
See Houser, supra note 37 (explaining how modern commercial generators work).
40
William K. Jones, An Example of a Regulatory Alternative to Antitrust: New York Utilities in the Early Seventies,
73 COLUM. L. REV. 462, 520-25 (1973).
41
See Marshall Brain & Robert Lamb, How Nuclear Power Works, HOW ST UFFW ORKS.COM, http://science.howstuff
works.com/nuclear-power2.htm(last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
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heat. 42 “To prevent overheating, control rods” may be inserted into the core, to regulate the rate
of the reaction. 43
“In some nuclear power plants,” a secondary water system carries out the remainder of
the process. 44 The first system circulates water around the core of the reactor, where the water
converts to steam, reaching a temperature of 550 degrees Fahrenheit. 45 The steam generator contains a separate enclosed water-system. 46 The water from the core heats up the water in the generator, converting it to steam. 47

The steam passes through a system of pipes and collides with

the blades of the turbine, forcing it to rotate. A shaft connects the turbine to the generator, converting the mechanical force of the turbine’s rotation into an electrical current.

Cooling water,

supplied from nearby lakes or other natural sources, condenses the steam back to water.
4. U.S. Nuclear Amperage
The United States is home to 104 nuclear reactors. 48 Based off of production capacity,
nuclear power accounts for 10% of the total nameplate capacity of U.S. based power generators. 49

Those 104 reactors historically average 90% net utilization of their nameplate capacity,

42

See N. States Power Co. v. United States, 151 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1998) (outlining a brief description of the
nuclear fission process). Uranium is a naturally occurring element and must be mined from the ground and enriched
through a series of refining processes. The enrichment phase increases the concentration of U235 isotope needed to
maintain the reaction. Id. The fission reaction begins when a neutron enters the nucleus of an U235 atom forcing it
to split into smaller nuclei and release more neutrons, causing a chain reaction. See Brain & Lamb, supra note 41..
43
Brain & Lamb, supra note 41.
44
Id.
45
Ben Casselman & Rebecca Smith, How Nuclear Reactors Work . . . And the Dangers When They Don’t, W ALL
ST . J., Mar. 14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704893604576200982857244 782.html.
46
See Brain & Lamb, supra note 41.
47
Id.
48
See Resources and Stats: U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST ., http://www.nei.org/resourcesand
stats/nuclear_statistics/usnuclearpowerplants/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). One megawatt is equivalent to 1000 kilowatts or one million watts of electricity. See Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. A DMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=M (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (defining “megawatt” as one million watts of electricity
or one-thousand kilowatts).
49
Total Energy: Annual Energy Review, U.S. ENERGY INFO. A DMIN. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/ totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.cfm?t=ptb0811a.
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making them much more efficient and reliable than competing sources. 50

Although nuclear en-

ergy commands only 10% of the nation’s nameplate capacity, it accounts for 20% of electricity
actually produced.

Comparatively, coal-powered facilities and natural gas powered plants ac-

count for 30% and 41%, respectively, of the overall nameplate capacity. 51 However, these statistics are based on production capability, not actual output. 52 According to the data for actual output, coal is the largest producer, accounting for 45% of total production. 53 Natural gas comes in
second at 23% of total production. 54

The ability to operate at 90% of its nameplate capacity,

well above competing sources, makes nuclear power a reliable source of carbon-free energy production.
C. Competing Sources
1. Natural Gas and Conventional Coal
Many factors affect the development of alternate sources of energy in the United States.
The economics of energy production are but one important consideration. Recent developments
in innovative drilling techniques for natural gas caused its market price to drop considerably,
thereby making it a competitive source for energy.

55

Price fluctuations due to seasonal demand

contribute some uncertainty to natural gas' economic competiveness, as compared to other

50

Compare Resources and Stats: U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, supra note 48 (nuclear facilities operate around 90%)
with Total Energy: Annual Energy Review, supra note 49 (natural gas production capability at 30% and coal production capability at 41%).
51
Total Energy: Annual Energy Review, supra note 49.
52
See Jennifer W. Fletcher et al., Constructing Power: The Near Term Outlook for Construction of Power Generation Projects in the 21 st Century, J. A M C. CONST RUCT ION LAW ., July 2011, at 4 (vol. 5, no. 2) (using net output statistics).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the
Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVT L. L. REV. 115, 118 (2009) (stating that innovations in horizontal and
hydraulic fracturing and drilling techniques enabled natural gas developers to drastically increase their production
capabilities); Fletcher et al., supra note 52.
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sources. 56

Conventional coal remains the most economically inexpensive source of electricity

production in the U.S. 57

However, the output rates for coal and natural gas are substantially

lower than that of nuclear power. In 2010, production from natural gas and coal reflected 34%
and 64%, respectively, of their overall nameplate capacities. 58
Given these disparities, the environmental consequences of energy production should also be taken into account when deciding which course to pursue. The price advantages of natural
gas and conventional coal over nuclear energy dissipate after taking into account their harmful
impact to the environment; as one commentator noted, “The true cost of coal is not expressed in
its market price or the levelized cost of generation.
public health at every stage of production.”59

Coal destroys the environment and harms

The same can be said for natural gas, though it

does produce 60% less carbon emissions than conventional coal. 60
2. Wind and Solar Energy
In 2010, wind and photovoltaic sources of energy accounted for only 2.9% of electricity
produced, due to a lack of productivity. 61

Wind energy operates at only 27% of its nameplate

capacity and solar energy averages only 14% of its nameplate capacity. 62 Although wind and solar produce a fraction of their nameplate capacities, they continue to receive significant federal
56

See John Shelton, Comment, Who, What, How, & Wind: The Texas Energy Market's Future Relationship with
Wind Energy and Whether It Will Be Enough to Meet the State's Needs, 11 TEX. TECH A DMIN. L.J. 401, 405 (2010)
(discussing fluctuations in natural gas prices in Texas).
57
Seth P. Cox, The Nuclear Option: Promotion of Advanced Nuclear Generation as a Matter of Public Policy, 5
A PPALACHIAN NAT . RESOURCES L.J. 25, 30 (2011).
58
Resources and Stats: U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, supra note 48 (combining variables from Energy Information
Administration data). Formula: Step One: (aggregate nameplate capacity for specific source) x (24 hours/day) x
(365 days/year) = Estimated yearly output for nameplate capacity. Step Two: (Actual output for given year) / (Estimated yearly output) = True Production Capability.
59
Cox, supra note 57, at 31.
60
Josh Lute, LNG Terminals: Future or Folly?, 43 W ILLAMET T E L. REV. 621, 627 (2007).
61
Table 1.1.A. Net Generation by Other Renewables: Total (All Sectors, 2002-October 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
A DMIN.: ELECT RIC POWER M ONT HLY (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.
cfm?t=epmt_1_1_a [hereinafter Net Generation by Other Renewables].
62
Wind turbines combined for a total nameplate capacity of 39,516 megawatts, yet operated at only 27% of that
amount. Similarly, solar (photovoltaic) energy totaled 8646 megawatts of nameplate capacity but produced only
14% of that amount. Combine variables from EIA data. See Total Energy: Annual Energy Review, supra note 49;
see also Net Generation by Other Renewables, supra note 61.

9

subsidies. 63
years. 64

As a result, wind and solar energy have significantly expanded over the past twenty

Renewable sources no longer stand as negligible alternatives to conventional methods

of producing electricity, though they are far from capable of handling current and future electricity demands. 65

In addition, there are ecological concerns that befuddle renewable energy de-

velopment. 66 These environmental setbacks present a challenging obstacle but by no means indicate that renewable energy is an incompatible solution to the growing demand for electricity.
Until production capabilities in renewable energy significantly improve, we must choose to develop new coal, natural gas, or nuclear plants to meet the growing demand for electricity.
The revitalization of nuclear energy as an alternative energy source is the best solution to
our future electricity needs, because of its ability to increase the national production capacity and
63

See Fletcher et al., supra note 52 (stating that wind receives $23.37 in federal subsidies and support and solar receives $24.34 per megawatt-hour).
64
Solar-power production increased 340% from a net yearly output of 357 GWh in 1990 to 1212 GWh in 2010.
Likewise, wind energy increased by 3393% in actual output from 2789 GWh in 1990 to 94,652 GWh in 2010. See
Net Generation by Other Renewables, supra note 61.
65
Some proponents of renewable alternatives believe sustainable production lies in the near future. See Christoph H.
Stefes, The German Solution: Feed-in Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011),http://www.nytimes.
com/roomfordebate/2011/09/20/why-isnt-the-us-a-leader-in-green-technology/us-should-emulate-germanysrenewable-energy-model. But the twenty-five-year outlook for renewable energy may not be so optimistic. The
long-term outlook supports the proposition that renewable alternatives will improve overall but continue to fall short
of supplanting conventional methods such as coal, natural gas, or nuclear energy. See generally Fletcher et al., supra note 52. The International Energy Agency in its 2010 Annual World Energy Outlook, reported that the global
electricity demand will increase 2.5% per year, making it the world’s fastest growing energy source. Charles K.
Ebinger & John P. Banks, The Geopolitics of Electricity, GLOBAL POST (Jan. 25, 2010, 08:23),http://
www.globalpost.com/dispatch/worldview/100114/electricity-developing-world. Also, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration anticipates that renewable resource production capacity will increase from 13% in 2011 to 16% in
2040. Today in Energy: EIA Projections Show U.S. Energy Production Growing Faster Than Consumption Through
2040, U.S. ENERGY INFO. A DMIN. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=9070. However,
the Energy Information Administration report on peak loads from all grids shows an average of 1.28% increase in
demand over an eleven-year period from 1999 to 2010. Electric Power Annual 2010 Data Table 4.1.A, U.S. ENERGY INFO. A DMIN. (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/table4.1a.cfm. Although renewable energy will continue to thrive as sources of energy, they are incapable of replacing natural gas or coal methods of production anytime in the near future.
66
Wind and solar projects generally require much more land in order to generate electricity compared to that of other conventional sources. Wind turbines create turbulence that may “significantly reduce the efficiency of a windfarm” and adversely affect the growth of nearby crops, causing “the land surface to become much warmer and drier.” Answers to Huge Wind-Farm Problems Are Blowin' in the Wind, SCIENCE DAILY (Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/12/081216104307.htm. Likewise, the best geographic locations for
commercialized solar-powered cells are deserts and large open fields that may have sensitive and vibrant species of
plants and animals. Fletcher et al., supra note 52. It may be necessary to clear large sections of vegetation to maximize photovoltaic exposure to the sun’s rays, forcing animals and wildlife to migrate to other less favorable regions.
See id.
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simultaneously reduce carbon emissions.

However, the burden of bearing the investment risks in

nuclear energy cannot rest solely on the shoulders of the private sector. 67 Expansion will not occur without effective government policies that reduce the financial risks of building and operating a nuclear power plant.
II. The Current Tax Regime
A. Tax Consequences for Nuclear Power Plants
Tax subsidies promote economic development and encourage certain actions of existing
taxpayers.

Subsidies frequently facilitate the creation of new businesses and the expansion of

existing businesses. 68 The same is true for commercial utility services. In order to better understand the long-term value of a tax-subsidy, it is important to analyze general tax consequences
for corporate utilities.
costly to build. 69

Without beneficial tax subsidies, a modern nuclear facility will be too

The lack of investment in nuclear power detrimentally affects our government

and society in four ways: (1) the government loses the long-term potential tax revenues; (2)
Americans go without the much needed employment opportunity; (3) less overall electricity is
produced from carbon-free energy; and (4) the environment suffers the continued detrimental
impacts of coal and natural gas production of electricity.

In Southern Pacific Transportation

Company v. Commissioner, the court noted that, “without such instigation by governmental bodies and absent any governmental subsidies it would appear highly unlikely, especially during
some of the financially troubled periods here involved, that these facilities would have been constructed.”70

Therefore, a tax subsidy is tantamount to an investment, and the government must

67

See Tomain, supra note 10, at 228.
See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 75 T.C. 497, 761 (1980) supplemented, 82 T.C. 122
(1984). See generally Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965,
977 (1998).
69
See Savino, supra note 7, at n.28.
70
S. Pac. Transp. Co., 75 T.C. at 761.
68
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carefully provide, allocate, and limit those subsidies so as to achieve the goal of economic expansion while increasing long-term tax revenues.

To better understand why a tax-subsidy for

nuclear power plants would be effective, this section focuses on the tax consequences associated
with planning, building, and operating a hypothetical nuclear facility. 71
1. Hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant
Every investor must determine the risks associated with pursuing a particular investment,
and then weigh those risks against the likelihood that the investment will return income in excess
of costs.

In terms of planning the construction of a nuclear power plant, investors must first ask

how much debt they need to incur to build a plant, how long it will take before operations commence, and how much it will cost to stay in business.

This determination can be illustrated by

analyzing the tax consequences of a hypothetical nuclear power plant. 72
Assume these basic facts for a simplified hypothetical nuclear power plant: On July 31,
2006, investors purchased a plot of land encompassing 1550 acres for $30 million, to be the future site of an advanced power plant, named “Nuclear.” On July 31, 2008, Nuclear’s investors
filed an application for a COL with the NRC for a new Westinghouse AP1000 reactor capable of
outputting at least 1000 megawatts of electricity. 73 The NRC approved the application on Feb-

71

The numbers, costs, and time-frames provided in the example are estimates based on public information. They
are intended to be as close to reality and as accurate as they can be. However, cost-overruns are unpredictable, inflation will affect the values on long-term estimations, and the tax code may change. See Chris Dubay, Taxmageddon:
Massive Tax Increases Coming in 2013, HERIT AGE FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2012/04/taxmageddon-massive-tax-increase-coming-in-2013.
72
Unfortunately, the cost of building a nuclear reactor is difficult to estimate due to unpredictable cost-overruns,
construction scheduling delays, and financing issues.
73
The Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design is capable of outputting an average of at least 1000 megawatts of electricity. The AP1000 has many improvements compared to previous reactor designs, including passive safety mechanisms which utilize gravity, natural circulation, and condensation and evaporation. The AP1000 reactor was designed to operate for sixty years ensuring a 50% longer economic life from previous designs. See generally U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULAT ORY COMM’N, FINAL SAFET Y EVALUAT ION REPORT RELATED TO CERT IFICATION OF THE AP1000
ST ANDARD DESIGN at 4-24 (NUREG-1793, Supp. 2), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1120/
ML112061231.pdf (discussing the design, output, and safety features of the Westinghouse AP1000 nuclear reactor).
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ruary 12, 2012. By January 1, 2013, construction of the facility began. At the peak of construction, Nuclear employed more than 2000 workers. 74
The total cost of construction will be $8 billion, of which 65% is attributable to construction costs and the remainder is attributable to financing costs. 75 The capital costs include acquisitions such as nuclear fuel rods, the construction of an on-site spent nuclear fuel storage facility,
plant operations buildings, construction of a cooling lake, the reactor and containment building
and all associated transmission equipment, equipment necessary to transfer coolant to the plant,
an administration building ($30 million), and various parking lots and roads ($40 million).

As-

sume the average loan repayment period from all forms of debt-related financing over the life of
the project is fifteen years, with an average interest rate of 6% per annum.
The facility will commence operations by July 31, 2020, with a nameplate capacity of
1000 megawatts and operate at an average of 93% of its capacity. At least 400 permanent employees will be required to safely operate Nuclear throughout the year. 76 Nuclear will charge an
average of 14.37 cents/kWh to its customers.

At the end of Nuclear’s economic life, the de-

commissioning expenses will total $525 million, about 10% of the capital cost to build the plant.
2. Levelized Cost of Energy for Hypothetical Plant
In order to determine whether Nuclear will be a profitable facility, its projected revenues
must exceed its projected costs. The Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) is a formula used to es74

Southern Company projects that “at the peak of construction” of Plant Vogtle Units 3 and 4, “more than 3,500
workers will be needed.” JOBS AT PLANT VOGT LE (n.d.) (Southern Co. promotional brochure), available at
http://www.southerncompany.com/nuclearenergy/pdf/Vogtle_Jobs_Brochure.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
75
Southern Company’s Plant Vogtle two nuclear reactors are projected to cost around $14 billion dollars and provide around 2200 megawatts of electricity. Steve Hargreaves, First New Reactors OK’d in Over 30 Years, CNN
M ONEY (Feb. 9, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/09/news/economy/nuclear_reactors/index.htm. Although the
costs of building the plants are exceptionally high, Southern Co. secured a federal loan guarantee of $8.3 billion. Id.
Thus Georgia Power—one of the utility companies forming the consortium building Plant Vogtle—is liable for
around $6 billion of the cost of building the two reactors of which 75% are construction costs and the remainder financing costs. Kristi E. Swartz, Vogtle Construction Cost Rise; Project Remains Under Budget, A T LANT A J.CONST ., Nov. 21, 2011, http://www.ajc.com/business/vogtle-construction-costs-rise-1236442.html.
76
Southern Company will employ “more than 800 permanent employees to operate” Units 3 and 4 at its Plant
Vogtle site. See JOBS AT PLANT VOGT LE, supra note 74.
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timate the projected costs of the nuclear facility on a kilowatt-hour basis. The LCOE estimates
the economic competitiveness of various alternative fuel sources by reducing numerous costvariables into a single value, the price per kWh that would be required to recover all the costs associated with each plant over its economic life. 77 The LCOE reflects the average minimum price
at which a utility would need to sell its electricity, in order to recover the costs of planning, constructing, and operating the plant. 78

Unfortunately, historic cost overruns during the construction

phase of nuclear power plants have led investors to doubt that advanced nuclear facilities will
achieve a competitive price-point in the consumer market. 79

Nuclear facilities completed in the

1980s and 1990s showed that actual costs were significantly higher than anticipated, and construction took much longer to complete due to long and unforeseen delays. 80 The Nuclear Energy Institute estimates the cost of modern nuclear reactors to be as high as $8 billion. 81 Because
the costs of building and operating a modern plant are uncertain, the LCOE should not be exclusively relied upon in determining the point at which cost overruns will limit or preclude a feasible return in a competitive market. 82

Even though the regulatory and political environments ac-

commodate the inception of modern nuclear power plants, investors must be certain that pursu-

77

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2011
(n.d.), available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/2016levelized_costs_aeo2011.pdf.
78
The LCOE takes into account overnight capital cost, fuel cost, fixed and variable operating and maintenance
costs, financing costs, and an assumed utilization rate for each source of energy. See generally Marcial T. Ocampo,
How to Calculate the Levelized Cost of Energy – A Simplified Approach, ENERGY TECH. EXPERT (Apr. 28, 2009),
http://energytechnologyexpert.com/cost-of-power-generation/how-to-calculate-the-levelized-cost-of-power-orenergy/. The purpose of the formula used to derive the LCOE for energy resources was to simplify the process in assessing the competitive risk for investors. Beware—this “simplified” approach utilizes a complicated formula. Id.
79
See JOHN M DEUT CH ET AL., UPDATE OF THE MIT 2003 FUT URE OF NUCLEAR POWER 8 (MIT Energy Initiative
2009), available at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf.
80
Id.
81
Nuclear Energy Institute Summarizes Nuclear Energy Legislation, TAX NOT ES TODAY, Oct. 21, 2009, at n.3, 2009
TNT 206-40 (LEXIS).
82
One possible reason for uncertainty in “overnight costs” is lack of data. Almost sixteen years have passed since
the most recent nuclear reactor commenced operations—the Watts Bar 1 in Tennessee began operations in 1996. See
Frequently Asked Questions: How Old Are U.S. Nuclear Power Plants and When Was the Last One Built?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. A DMIN., http://205.254.135.7/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=228&t=21 (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). Likewise,
the last submitted application for a COL was over thirty years ago. See Frye, supra note 33, at 283.
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ing the extraordinary expense associated with building a new reactor will be a profitable enterprise. 83
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology initiated a study to help understand the financial implications of building a modern nuclear power plant.

Its researchers estimated the LCOE

for nuclear energy in 2002. Based on an 85% net utilization rate and a forty-year economic life,
the study projected the LCOE for nuclear power at 6.7 cents/kWh compared to coal at 4.2
cents/kWh and natural gas at 3.8 cents/kWh. 84 Researchers updated their findings in 2007, when
construction costs of nuclear facilities were expected to double previous estimates.

The new

LCOE values yielded 8.4 cent/kWh for nuclear, 6.2 cents/kWh for coal, and 6.5 cents/kWh for
natural gas. 85 The study further noted that nuclear power would become competitive if a carbon
tax was imposed on coal and natural gas powered plants. 86
With respect to Nuclear, the financing period and capital costs will be important factors
in determining the minimum cost of energy. 87

Nuclear’s reactor will require around seventy-five

tonnes of low-enriched uranium to operate its core. 88 In March of 2011, the total estimated cost

83

The LCOE analysis will benefit these investors by providing the required cost per/kWh of energy in a certain year
necessary to cover the costs of building and operating a nuclear facility over an assumed economic life.
84
ST EPHEN A NSOLABEHERE ET AL., THE FUT URE OF NUCLEAR POWER 7 (MIT Energy Initiative, 2003), available at
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-full.pdf.
85
DEUT CH ET AL., supra note 79, at 6 tbl. 1.
86
Id. at 7.
87
For Nuclear’s first year of operations, it must pay $531,629,802 in debt repayment expenses of which
$308,942,267 is attributable to interest payments and $222,687,535 is attributable to principal. Computed using a
loan repayment calculator. Principal = $5.25 billion. Interest = 6%/year. Repayment Period = 15 years. In addition,
refueling costs must be taken into account. A typical reactor will operate the nuclear core by utilizing a cycling
method for its nuclear fuel. See The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, W ORLD NUCLEAR A SS’N, http://www.worldnuclear.org/education/nfc.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (noting that a 1000 megawatt reactor will require approximately 75 tonnes of low enriched uranium). About every ten to sixteen months, one-third of the fuel rods need to be
replaced. See N. States Power Co. v. United States, 151 F.3d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1998).
88
One “tonne” is a metric ton, equal to 1000 kilograms or 2,204.62 lbs. Our hypothetical nuclear power plant would
require approximately 75,000 kilograms or 165,346.5 lbs. of low-enriched uranium to operate. See The Nuclear
Fuel Cycle, supra note 87 (noting that a 1,000 megawatt reactor will require approximately 75 tonnes of low enriched uranium).
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of a nuclear fuel rod was $2,770 per kilogram. 89 Approximately $208 million of Nuclear's capital costs come from the expense of nuclear fuel rods. Furthermore, Nuclear’s first refueling cycle will total approximately $69,250,000 or an average of 0.85 cents/kWh each year. 90 The average cost in terms of kilowatt hours for these expenses will be approximately 7.37 cents/kWh.
Based on these variables, an LCOE of 8.4 cents/kWh might be an appropriate estimate. To be
conservative, assume Nuclear incurs costs of 10 cents/kWh to produce electricity throughout the
year. With these background facts in mind, it is possible to understand the tax treatment of Nuclear’s operations.
3. Gross Revenue
It is necessary to compute Nuclear’s gross revenues for its first year of operations to understand the extent of any deductions that may affect its tax liability. Given that Nuclear has a
nameplate capacity of 1000 megawatts, operates at 93% of its nameplate capacity, and charges
its customers 14.37 cents/kWh for electricity, Nuclear’s gross revenues will total over $1.17 billion by the end of its first year of operations. 91
B. Expenses, Capital Expenditures, and Depreciation
Most expenses associated with the production of income may be deducted, relieving the
taxpayer of liability for amounts equivalent to the reimbursement value. 92

Because the govern-

ment taxes net income, gain, and profits, deductions from gross income ultimately decrease an

89

See The Economics of Nuclear Power, W ORLD NUCLEAR A SS’N, http://world-nuclear.org/info/inf02.html (last updated Dec. 2012).
90
Computed as follows: ($2,770 average cost/kg of fuel rod) x (75,0000 kg) / [(1,000 megawatts) x (1,000 kilowatts) x (24 hours) x (365 days) x (93% operating capacity)] = 0.85 cents/kWh. In 2011, the average cost of refueling a reactor was around $40 million for each cycle (one-third of the core) or 0.68 cents/kWh of electricity produced. See Resources and Stats: Costs: Fuel, Operation and Waste Disposal, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST .,
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/nuclear_statistics/costs/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
91
Computed as follows: (1,000 megawatt nameplate capacity) x (1,000 kilowatts/megawatt) x (24 hours/day) x (365
days/year) x (93% output average) x (14.37 cents/kWh produced and sold) = $1,170,695,160.
92
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2012).
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entity’s taxable income resulting in less tax paid to the government. 93 Yet, deductions are more
than just a legislative grace, as compared to tax credits or direct federal subsidies. 94 While tax
credits and direct federal subsidies are limited in scope and duration, deductions are permitted
routinely for every qualifying year, allowing for an equitable adjustment to the taxpayer’s income and preventing unnecessary taxation of expenditures related to routine economic activity. 95
1. Start-up Expenditures
The formation of a business usually requires investors to expend start-up expenditures,
such as the costs of incorporating a business or training employees before business operations
commence.

Under § 195 of the Code, these amounts may be deducted from income. 96 For a

large company, start-up expenditures must be capitalized—not deducted entirely from gross receipts—and taken as a ratable deduction for the fifteen-year period beginning from the month in
which the active trade or business begins. 97 The practical effect of § 195 is that no deductions
will be taken until the nuclear power plant commences operations by producing electricity.
Modern nuclear facilities that incur large costs during the start-up phase suffer from the
capitalization requirement for two reasons.

First, because the ratable deduction must be taken

over a fifteen-year period, they suffer the detrimental loss in the time-value of money as com-

93

A reduction in gross receipts will lead to an overall reduction of tax liability.
But cf. INDOPCO, Inc. v. C.I.R., 503 U.S. 79, 80 (1992) (noting that deductions are grants of legislative grace).
95
See generally 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 161-199 (West 2012) (code provisions pertaining to itemized deductions for individuals and corporations).
96
26 U.S.C.A. § 195(b)(1) (West 2012).
97
26 U.S.C.A. § 195(b)(1)(B) (West 2012). The deduction, however, is not to exceed $10,000 and begins to phase
out once start-up expenditures exceed $70,000—reducing the deduction to $0. Id.§ 195(b)(3). The policy supporting § 195 is similar to the Court’s holding in INDOPCO, Inc. v. C.I.R. that expenditures incurred in the successful
creation of a new business are non-deductible capital expenditures. See Costs of Starting a New Business, 34 A M.
JUR. 2D Federal Taxation ¶ 16291; see also INDOPCO, Inc., 503 U.S. at 90 (holding that expenses incurred in a
friendly takeover do not qualify as ordinary and necessary under § 162 of the Code). Hence the puny $10,000 deduction and the residual 15-year capitalization period. More fundamentally, start-up expenditures mirror those of business-expense deductions, which cannot be taken until the enterprise is up and running.
94

17

pared to a shorter period of capitalization. 98 Second, the deduction is ratable in a manner akin to
straight-line depreciation, rather than double-declining or 150%-declining methods under normal
ACRS rules. 99 Straight-line depreciation may be computed by taking the total value of the capital expense and dividing by the number of years to be depreciated. For start-up expenditures, the
taxpayer will take a deduction from income in the amount of one-fifteenth of the total cost of
starting the business, as the capitalization period is fifteen years. Normally for property purchases that have a class life of fifteen years, the taxpayer may take advantage of accelerated depreciation deductions under § 168, using the “150 percent declining balance method,” to yield a larger
deduction.

For Nuclear, the start-up expenditures incurred would result from employee training

costs and salaries prior to commencing operations. If the average training cost per employee for
a one-year period is $10,000 and the average salary per employee is $55,000, then start-up expenditures will constitute approximately $26 million.

Assuming other miscellaneous start-up

expenditures total $10 million, the aggregate start-up expenditures amount to $36 million. Based
on this figure, the yearly deduction for Nuclear’s start-up expenditures would be $2.4 million
dollars for the first fifteen years. 100
2. Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses
Current operating expenses are deducted under § 162 of the Code. However, the acquisition costs of any asset with a useful life of more than one year are not deductible. 101 For this rea-

98

This is because a shorter capitalization period would result in a more valuable yearly deduction for the facility
given the inflation and opportunity costs associated with the time deprivation of using the money presently versus
using it in the future.
99
26 U.S.C.A. § 168(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A) (West 2012). The 150% declining balance method may be computed in
year one by taking the value of the asset divided by the number of years the asset is to be depreciated (fifteen years)
then multiplying by 150%. To compute for year two, subtract the deduction taken in year one from the value of the
asset, then divide by fifteen and multiply by 150%. Continue for each subsequent year until the year in which the
straight-line method would result in a greater deduction. In that year, switch to the straight-line method and continue for the remaining years.
100
Computed as follows: ($36 million) / (15 years) = $2.4 million per year.
101
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 167 (West 2012).
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son, Nuclear cannot deduct the cost of the buildings, reactor, fuel rods, or fixtures. Section 162
of the Code permits a deduction for “ordinary and necessary expenses” in carrying on any trade
or business. 102 Under § 162 of the Code, business expenses may be deducted where the benefit
of the payment is realized within the current taxable year.
the outlay must be “ordinary and necessary.”104
the duration of the benefit.

103

To qualify as a business expense,

Whether an expense is “ordinary” depends on

If the taxpayer realizes the benefit within the year the expenditure is

made, it is very likely to be a deductible expense pursuant to § 162. The typical example is employee salary.

Conversely, if the benefit is realized over more than a year, the expenditure must

be capitalized, i.e., not deducted, pursuant to § 263. It is important to understand the difference
between an expenditure that qualifies as a deductible expense and one that must be capitalized. 105

The significance between deductible and capital expenditures is that an ordinary and

necessary business expense may be deducted entirely for the year it is incurred, while capital expenditures are depreciated annually based on the useful life of the asset purchased. The result is
that capital expenditures are not fully deductible in the year the expense occurs, forcing a loss in
the time-value of money over the depreciation period.
The facts and circumstances of the transaction have an important role in distinguishing
the often fine-line between business expenses and capital expenditures. For nuclear facilities, the
most valuable deductible expenses include reactor maintenance expenses and employee salaries. 106

In fact, the deductibility of maintenance expenses associated with removing a component

102

Id. § 162(a).
See Stevens v. C.I.R., 388 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding that the taxpayer may deduct “recurring expenditures where the benefit derived from the payment is realized and exhausted within the taxable year”).
104
26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a).
105
In the case of capital expenditures related to depreciable assets, the full value of a capital expense must be incrementally deducted to its salvage value. Id. § 168(b)(4). Under favorable depreciation rules the salvage value is $0,
according to the rules set forth in §§ 167 and 168 of the Code (depreciation sections).
106
Another valuable deduction may be taken for research and development costs under § 174. See id. § 174 (permitting a deduction for research and experimentation associated with a trade or business).
103
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of the reactor to maintain the status quo of the reactor’s production can be quite complicated.
Generally, expenses incurred in the removal of a depreciable asset in connection with the installation of a replacement asset are deductible. 107 For instance, when nuclear fuel rods must be replaced, the expenses associated with removing the old rods may be deducted rather than capitalized into the cost of the new rods. There remains a slight, yet notable distinction when removing
the component of a depreciable asset.

In the example above, the nuclear fuel rods constituted

depreciable assets rather than a component of a depreciable asset, because they had a useful life
of more than one year.

The deducibility or capitalization of expenses incurred in removing and

replacing a component of a depreciable asset will depend on whether the replacement constitutes
a repair or improvement to the depreciable asset. 108 If replacement is a repair, the expenses may
be deducted; conversely, if the replacement amounts to an improvement, the expenses must be
capitalized and depreciated.
Nuclear is capable of operating at an average of 93% of its 1000 megawatt nameplate capacity.

The average yearly expenses are computed from the LCOE estimated above, less the

costs of the nuclear fuel rods.

This is because the LCOE takes into account the refueling costs

associated with operating the plant, and other costs characterized as capital expenditures and associated interest expenses. 109

Next, subtract the amount attributable to future decommissioning

107

Rev. Rul. 2000-7, 2000-1 C.B. 712.
See Permanent Plant Closure Not Required for Decommissioning Costs, TAX NOT ES TODAY (Aug. 3, 2009),
2009 TNT 146-20 (LEXIS) (IRS memorandum of March 11, 2009, on nuclear decommissioning costs) (concluding
that “the costs of removing a component of a depreciable asset are either deductible or capitalizable based on whether replacement of the component constitutes a repair or an improvement”).
109
It will not be necessary at this time to subtract the $5 million associated with the purchase of the land because it
was a capital expenditure included in the loan repayment costs. However, the value of the land must be removed in
determining the depreciation value of the plant.
108
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expenses. 110

The deductible business expenses for Nuclear’s first year of operations would be

approximately $123.6 million. 111
3. Interest Expenses
Section 163 of the Code 112 allows a deduction of the interest expenses paid in a trade or
business on indebtedness. 113 Due to the similarity between interest payments and § 162 business
expenses, business-related interest expenses would be deductible even if § 163 did not exist. Financing a nuclear energy plant often requires a multifaceted credit plan. 114 The interest accrued
during the construction period of the facility must be capitalized into the overall expense of
building the nuclear facility. 115

Once construction is complete and production begins, the tax-

payer may deduct from gross revenue an amount equal to the interest expense incurred in paying
its liabilities.

For Nuclear, the interest expenses associated with the $5.25 billion loan would

amount to $309 million in Nuclear’s first year of operations. 116

110

Decommissioning expenses will be discussed below. For purposes of this example, the applicable amount of future decommissioning expenses will total $8.75 million/year.
111
Computed as follows: First, determine costs by subtracting fuel costs from LCOE (8 cents) – (.85 cents/kWh refueling costs) = 8.15 cents/kWh. Next determine nameplate hourly output at (1,000 megawatts) x (1,000 kilowatts)
= (1 million average kilowatt output per hour). Then determine total yearly output (1 million kilowatts) x (24
hours/day) x (365 days/year) x (93% average hourly output) = 8.1468 billion kWh’s produced in a year. Then determine total yearly cost at (8.1468 billion kWh’s) x (8.15 cents/kWh) = $663,964,200. Then subtract the total costs
of the loan payments and decommissioning expenses, ($663,964,200) – ($531,629,802 loan payments) – ($8.75 million future decommissioning expenses) = $123,584,398 of ordinary and necessary expenditures.
112
26 U.S.C.A. § 163 (West 2012).
113
Revenue Ruling 69-188 explains the principle of interest as follows:
[F]or tax purposes, interest has been defined by the Supreme Court of the United States as the
amount one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money and as the compensation paid for
the use or forbearance of money . . . . The payment or accrual of interest . . . must be incidental to
an unconditional and legally enforceable obligation . . . .
Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54.
114
Ben-Moshe et al., supra note 34, at 505-06.
115
26 U.S.C.A. § 263A(a)(2)(B) (West 2012). See Encyclopedia Britannica v. United States, 685 F.2d 212, 214 (7th
Cir. 1982) (holding that the payments for acquisition of an asset which would yield income over a period of years
must be capitalized into the basis of the asset).
116
Computed using a loan repayment calculator. Note that the amount of the principal paid in the first year would
equal $222,687,535 and the total interest would be $308,942,267.
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4. Decommissioning Expenses
When a nuclear facility is no longer in service, it must go through the two-step process of
“decommissioning.”

First, the facility must remove any equipment or materials contaminated

with radiation, and place spent nuclear fuel rods in dry storage until final disposal. Second, the
plant will be disassembled, which may take years to complete. 117

Nuclear decommissioning

costs are defined broadly to include expenses incurred before, during, and after the actual decommissioning process. 118

More specifically, nuclear decommissioning costs encompass “all

otherwise deductible expenses to be incurred in connection with the entombment, decontamination, dismantlement, removal, and disposal of the structures, systems and components of a nuclear power plant” that has permanently ceased the production of electric energy. 119

Section

468A(a) permits a current deduction for the future costs of decommissioning a nuclear power
plant if the owners of the facility deposit contributions into a Nuclear Decommissioning Reserve
Fund. 120

This broadly-reaching tax incentive provides a substantial benefit to nuclear facilities

facing decommissioning costs as high as $400 million. 121
Section 468A limits the amount of the deduction to the “ruling amount,” which is the
amount approved by the Secretary to ensure that the costs of decommissioning are covered but
that no excess deductions are made over the economic useful life of the nuclear power plant. 122
Although costs associated with the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant may generally be
117

See generally Nuclear Waste Disposal: Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST .
(Oct. 2010), http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/nuclearwastedisposal/factsheet/ decommissioningnuclearpowerplants/?page=1. The second step may be accomplished by choosing one of three options: (1) “Decon” (decontamination) disassemble and remove any contaminated parts then ship “to a low-level waste disposal
site”; (2) “Safstor” (safe storage) safely store any contaminated materials on-site, wait 50 years for radioactive decay, then continue with disassembly; or (3) “Entomb” encase the radioactive structures in concrete and appropriately
maintain the site until radioactive decay is at safe level. Id.
118
See Private Letter Ruling 9638001, 1996 PLR LEXIS 1149.
119
26 C.F.R. § 1.468A-1(b)(6) (West 2012).
120
26 U.S.C.A. § 468A(a) (West 2012).
121
See Nuclear Waste Disposal: Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants, supra note 117.
122
26 U.S.C.A. § 468A(d)(2).
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deducted, the rules for capitalization remain unaltered. 123

Some costs associated with decom-

missioning the plant may qualify as “nuclear decommissioning costs,” but must still be capitalized. 124
For Nuclear, the decommissioning costs will be approximately 10% of the capital costs
or $525 million, assuming that Nuclear plans to decommission in sixty years and receives approval by the Secretary to make even yearly contributions to a Nuclear Decommissioning Reserve Fund in accordance with § 468A(a).

Therefore, Nuclear will contribute approximately

$8.75 million to the Decommissioning Fund each year and will be permitted a deduction for the
same amount.
5. Depreciation
The government taxes net income, leaving the costs incurred in the production of income
untouched.

To further this goal, Congress created a cost-recovery system known as “deprecia-

tion” which permits a yearly deduction for the exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence of
certain depreciable assets. 125 The cost recovery of capital expenditures used to purchase depreciable property occurs over a certain number of years. This period is known as the “recovery period,” and is based on the asset’s value, class life, and the depreciation method used. 126
It is necessary to determine the amount of Nuclear’s deduction for each depreciable asset,
including the power plant itself and the nuclear fuel assemblies, in order to determine its total
depreciation deduction.

According to IRS Publication No. 946, an electric utility nuclear pro-

123

See Private Letter Ruling 9638001, supra note 118.
Id. For instance, expenses incurred in the construction of an independent spent fuel storage building during the
decommissioning of a nuclear facility must be capitalized even though such expenditures are properly characterized
as nuclear decommissioning expenses.
125
Limited to property used in the trade or business, or property held for the production of income. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 167(a) (West 2012).
126
The taxpayer must determine the depreciable asset’s “recovery period,” which is determined from its “class life.”
The class life is essentially the midpoint of the Asset Depreciation Range. Id. § 168(e)(1). See generally Rev. Proc.
87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674.
124
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duction plant has a class life of twenty years. However, the IRS grants a beneficial recovery period of fifteen years under the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System. 127 Because the nuclear power plant is classified as twenty-year property, it must utilize the 150% declining balance
method under § 168. 128 When Nuclear commences operations on July 31, 2020, the applicable
convention will be the half-year convention under § 168(d), which treats the property as though
it were placed in service at the mid-point of the taxable year. 129 For Nuclear’s first year of operation, the depreciation deduction allocable to the power plant would be 5% of its cost or approximately $157 million. 130

127

IRS Publication 946, provides that an Electric Utility Nuclear Production Plant has a twenty-year class life and
fifteen-year recovery period. The depreciable property “includes assets used in the nuclear power production and
electricity for sale and related land improvements.” However, it “[d]oes not include nuclear fuel assemblies.” See
IRS, U.S. DEP ’T OF T HE TREASURY, HOW T O DEPRECIAT E PROPERT Y tbl. B-2, asset class 49.12, at 112 (Publ’n 946,
2012) [hereinafter HOW T O DEPRECIAT E PROPERT Y], available at: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p946.pdf (“Electric Utility Nuclear Production Plant”). The Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) is the current
depreciation system added to the Code in 1986. The MACRS is applicable to tangible property placed in service after December 31, 1986. 26 C.F.R. § 1.168(a)-1(a) (West 2012).
128
26 U.S.C.A. § 168(b)(2)(A) (West 2012).
129
Id. § 168(d)(1), (d)(4)(A). Under § 168(d)(1) the general rule is to presume the half-year convention on all property unless that section of the Code provides otherwise. Property is considered to be placed in service when it is
“placed in a condition or state of readiness and availability for a specifically assigned function.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.463(d)(1)(ii) (West 2012).
130
See Rev. Proc. 87-57, tbl. 1, 1987-2 C.B. 687 (depreciation deduction table). Depreciation deductions must be
calculated from the aggregate cost of the applicable property that may be properly classified as “Electric Utility Nuclear Production Plant.” For instance, the total capital costs included the construction of an administrative building
unrelated to the production of electricity cost $30 million. Likewise, the storage building for spent nuclear fuel totaled $40 million. The costs associated with the purchase of nuclear fuel rods amounted to $207,750,000. Also, the
startup expenditures of $36 million and the construction of various parking lots and roads totaled $40 million. The
remaining capital costs might also include an operations fund, employee salaries fund, various expense funds,
maintenance and repair funds, and marketing and advertising campaign funds. Therefore, for the sake of this example, it is necessary to make a presumption on the value of the power plant’s depreciable property. To do so, assume
the cost of the nuclear reactor and applicable property totals 60% of the capital costs or $3.15 billion. Compute the
depreciation deduction as follows: ($3.15 billion) x (5% year one depreciation with half-year convention) =
$157,500,000. In the second year, the amount of depreciation will increase significantly to account for a full taxable
year.
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The same analysis is required for each asset listed in the hypothetical. In the case of the
administration building, the depreciation deduction would be $738,000. 131 For the spent nuclear
fuel storage building, Nuclear may take a depreciation deduction of $984,400. 132 The allocable
deduction for the initial fuel rods would be $41.5 million. 133

If, during the first year of opera-

tions, Nuclear purchases more fuel rods in anticipation of the refueling cycle that will take place
in its second year of operations, then the fuel assemblies will be deemed “placed in service” in
the year that Nuclear acquires them. 134 Nuclear would properly claim a depreciation deduction
of $13.9 million. 135 The depreciation deduction for the various roads and parking lots would be
$2 million. 136 Therefore, the total depreciation deduction Nuclear could claim for its first year of
operations would amount to $214.6 million. 137

131

Under 26 U.S.C. § 168(c), nonresidential real property has a recovery period of thirty-nine years. The applicable
depreciation method is straight-line depreciation under 26 U.S.C.A. § 168(b)(3)(A) (West 2012). Nuclear must use
the mid-month convention to depreciate the administration building under id. § 168(d)(2)(A). The instructions to
IRS Form 4562 provide the depreciation table for thirty-nine-year nonresidential real property placed in service at
the mid-point of July. IRS, DEP ’T OF T HE TREASURY, INST RUCT IONS FOR IRS FORM 4562 (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i4562.pdf. The applicable depreciation percentage is 2.461% for year one. Compute
the depreciation deduction as follows: ($30 million admin. Building) x (2.461% depreciation deduction) = $738,300
deduction.
132
Compute the depreciation deduction as follows: ($40 million storage facility) x (2.461% depreciation deduction)
= $984,400 deduction.
133
See generally FLP Group, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. C.I.R., 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 202 (T.C. 2005) (finding that nuclear
fuel assemblies have a class life of five years, and referencing Rev. Rul. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674 for the same proposition). See also Rev. Rul. 72-507, 1972-2 C.B. 198 (finding that whether nuclear fuel assembly has a useful life of
3-5 years is a question of fact). But see HOW T O DEPRECIATE PROPERT Y, supra note 127 (specifically providing that
nuclear fuel assemblies have a class life of five years and a recovery period of five years). Under 26 U.S.C. §
168(c), five-year property has a recovery period of five years. Under 26 U.S.C. § 168(b)(1), the 200% declining
balance method is used and the applicable convention is the half-year convention under 26 U.S.C. § 168(d)(1). The
depreciation deduction percentage is 20% for Nuclear’s first year of operation. Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-2 C.B. 687,
tbl. 1. Compute depreciation deduction as follows: ($207.75 million fuel assembly cost) x (20% depreciation deduction percentage) = $41,550,000.
134
N. States Power Co. v. United States, 151 F.3d 876, 880-81 (8th Cir. 1998).
135
Compute the depreciation deduction as follows: ($207.75 million) x (33% of the fuel assemblies to be replaced
after year one) x (20% depreciation percentage) = $13,850,000 depreciation deduction.
136
The roads and parking lot qualify as land improvements with a twenty-year class life and a fifteen-year recovery
period. HOW T O DEPRECIAT E PROPERT Y, supra note 127, tbl. B-1, asset class 00.3, at 104 (“Land Improvements”).
137
Add each computed depreciation deduction for an aggregate deduction of $213,723,900.
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C. Hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant Pre-Credit Tax Liability
Lastly, it is necessary to determine Nuclear’s tax liability based on the corporate tax
brackets enumerated in the Code. Nuclear’s gross revenues total over $1.17 billion. 138 Once all
the deductions are taken into account, Nuclear’s taxable income will be approximately $512.4
million. At a 35% corporate income tax rate, its pre-credit tax liability will be $179.3 million. 139
The following table summarizes the first-year tax liability for Nuclear:

III. Current Nuclear-Specific Tax Incentives
A. Energy Policy Act of 2005- Tax Incentives
Congress enacted the EPA-2005 with the intent to encourage the future development of
and investment in alternative production sources of electricity in the United States. 140
energy provides a compelling option in fulfilling this goal.

138

Nuclear

Of significant benefit, is nuclear

Computed as follows: (1000 megawatt nameplate capacity) x (1000 kilowatts/megawatt) x (24 hours/day) x (365
days/year) x (93% output average) x (14.37 cents/kWh produced and sold) = $1,170,695,160.
139
$513,294,595 taxable revenues and $179,653,108.30 total pre-credit tax liability.
140
See Nuclear Energy Institute Submits Comments on Nuclear Power Production Credit, TAX NOT ES TODAY (Mar.
30, 2006), 2006 TNT 61-19 (LEXIS) (letter from Richard J. Myers to John Parcell, dated January 18, 2006).
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power's potential to help meet growing energy needs while “emit[ting] no environmentally detrimental fumes” traditionally associated with coal and natural gas. 141

The production costs for

nuclear power have continued to decline, dropping to an average of 1.76 cents per kWh in
2007, 142 while the costs associated with licensing, financing, building, and operating modern nuclear facilities have continued to rise, and pose a formidable impediment to the expansion of nuclear power. 143

Although it was once believed that nuclear power would be “too cheap to me-

ter,”144 the capital costs of building a modern nuclear plant are much higher than those for coal
or natural gas. 145
B. Production Tax Credit for Advanced Nuclear Power Facilities
The EPA-2005 provided much needed help for investors, by authorizing a production tax
credit for advanced nuclear facilities for their first eight years of operation. 146

On August 8,

2005, the EPA-2005 added § 45J, the Credit for Production from Advanced Nuclear Power Facilities, to the Internal Revenue Code.

The credit was designed to facilitate commercial interest

in building advanced nuclear power plants before the year 2021.

The section provides modern

nuclear energy plants with a production credit of up to 1.8 cents per kWh, for electricity produced by the taxpayer and sold to an unrelated party147 during the first eight years of the facility’s operation. 148 To qualify as an “advanced nuclear facility,” the NRC must approve the reactor design after December 31, 1993. 149 In addition, the facility must also be owned by the tax-

141

See Savino, supra note 7.
Id.
143
See A NSOLABEHERE ET AL., supra note 84, at 38.
144
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMAT ION 8 (1987).
145
See Savino, supra note 7.
146
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
147
26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(a)(2)(B) (West 2012).
148
Id. § 45J(a)(2)(A).
149
Id. § 45J(d)(2).
142
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payer, utilize nuclear energy to produce electricity, and be placed in service after August 8, 2005,
but before January 1, 2021. 150
The amount of the credit is limited to $125 million per 1000 megawatt capacity. There is
also a “national limitation” allocated on a pro rata basis after determining each reactor’s portion
of the 6000 megawatt national nameplate capacity. 151

The value of the credit will therefore not

exceed $750 million per year with a maximum net value not exceeding $6 billion dollars over
eight years. 152

Although the credit appears enticing, Congress has substantially limited its poten-

tial scope and value in five ways: (1) an application cutoff date for qualification; (2) the “national
limitation;” (3) an annual credit amount; (4) a phaseout limitation; and (5) no adjustment for inflation for the value of the credit. 153 Each limitation will be discussed in turn.
C. Limitations
1. COL Application Cutoff Date for Qualified Facilities
The taxpayer must submit an application for a construction and operating license (COL)
with the NRC no later than December 31, 2008, to qualify for the tax credit. 154 Construction of
the facility must begin before January 1, 2014. 155

Construction “begins” for purposes of the

credit when the taxpayer “initiates the pouring of safety-related concrete for the reactor building.”156 With December 31, 2008, as the cutoff date, no new applications qualify for the § 45J
credit. By the end of 2008, the NRC had received sixteen applications proposing a total of twen150

Id. § 45J(d)(1)(A), (B).
Id. § 45J(b). The credit will be reduced further by each facility’s proportion of the aggregate nameplate capacity
of all qualifying facilities. That percentage is used to reduce the 6000 megawatt limitation to each facility. Id.
152
Computed as follows: First, ($125 million x 6) = $750 million. Second, ($750 million x 8) = $6 billion.
153
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(a)(1), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2), (d)(1)(B).
154
Although IRS Notice 2006-40 provides a cutoff date of December 31, 2007, the Service later determined the final
date to be December 31, 2008. I.R.S. Notice 2006-1 C.B. 855, § 3.01(1). See Savino, supra note 7, at n. 46 (“According to Tax Notes, although the notice as released specifies a December 31, 2007, deadline for filing a COL application, ‘[a]ccording to the IRS, the correct date . . . is December 31, 2008’”) (citing IRS Issues Interim Guidance
for Nuclear Power Production Credit, TAX NOT ES DAILY (Apr. 12, 2006), 2006 TNT 70-6 (LEXIS)).
155
Credit for Production from Advanced Nuclear Facilities, I.R.S. Notice 2006-40, 2006-1 C.B. 855, § 3.01(2)
[hereinafter I.R.S. Notice 2006-40], available at 2006 WL 924985.
156
Id.
151
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ty-four nuclear units. 157 Since January 1, 2009, only one application was submitted and accepted
by the NRC. 158 Three more are expected in 2012; however, none of these post-2008 applicants
will qualify for the credit. 159 It is apparent that interest in building new reactors dropped significantly after the December 31, 2008, cutoff date.

That only one new application has been filed

since 2008 lends support to the proposition that investors will generally refuse to go forward
with construction unless a credit is available.

If Congress were to remove the cutoff date, it

would allow new applicants to qualify for the credit, and increase interest in building new reactors.
2. The National Limitation
Section 45J imposes a “national limitation” of 6000 megawatts, as determined from the
aggregate nameplate capacities of all qualifying facilities. 160

The national limitation restricts the

maximum amount of kilowatt-hours from which the 1.8 cent credit shall be computed. 161

The

limitation determines each facility’s proportion of the aggregate nameplate capacity162 that bears
the same ratio to 6000 megawatts. 163 The Service determined that if the sum of the “nameplate
capacity[ies] of all qualifying facilities . . . does not exceed the national megawatt capacity limitation, [then] each of those facilities will be allocated” its actual nameplate capacity. 164 If a total
of six (6) qualifying facilities have an aggregate nameplate capacity of 6000 megawatts (1000
actual megawatts for each separate facility), then each facility would be allocated its actual
nameplate capacity of 1000 megawatts.

However, if their aggregate nameplate capacity exceeds

157

See Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications, supra note 35.
Id.
159
Id.
160
26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(b)(2) (West 2012).
161
Id. § 45J(b).
162
The sum of all other qualifying facilities’ nameplate capacities.
163
The Secretary determines the manner in which to allocate the national megawatt capacity limitation among qualifying facilities. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(b).
164
I.R.S. Notice 2006-40, supra note 155, § 3.03(1).
158
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the national limit, IRS Notice 2006-40 provides that the 6000 megawatt capacity will be allocated in proportion to each facility’s nameplate capacity. 165
The following example illustrates the national limitation’s application.

If a total of twen-

ty-six nuclear facilities combined for an aggregate nameplate capacity of 26,000 megawatts, with
each facility having an actual nameplate capacity of 1000 megawatts, then each facility’s allocated capacity under § 45J(b)(2) would be approximately 230.769 megawatts. 166 The practical effect is that a facility capable of operating at a maximum output of 1000 megawatts per hour can
only take advantage of the production tax credit as if it were operating at 230 megawatts/hour,
resulting in a significant reduction of the credit’s potential value for that facility. If Nuclear was
among those twenty-six facilities, it too would be treated as having an adjusted nameplate capacity of just 230.769 megawatts.
3. Annual Limitation of Credit Amount
The annual credit limitation reduces the net value of the credit to each taxpayer. It is perhaps the most confusing limitation of § 45J, because the statute itself cannot be given effect
without the use of the Secretary’s formulated allocation-regulations, found in IRS Notice 200640.

The statute provides that the annual limit of the credit shall not exceed the “amount which

bears the same ratio to $125 [million] as . . . [the allocated] capacity limitation . . . bears to
1,000.”167

It is instructive to look at the Secretary’s formulated approach to determine how to

compute the annual limitation. 168

First, compute the “tentative credit” by multiplying 1.8 cents

165

Id. § 3.03(2).
The formula for allocated capacity is [(reactor nameplate capacity) / (aggregate nameplate capacity)] x (6,000
megawatts). In the example, the allocated nameplate capacity would be computed as follows: [(1,500 megawatt actual nameplate capacity of individual facility) / (39,000 megawatt aggregate nameplate capacity)] x (6,000 megawatt
national limitation).
167
26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(c)(1), (2).
168
See I.R.S. Notice 2006-40, supra note 155, § 2.04(1)-(3).
166
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“by the kilowatt hours of qualified electricity produced” and sold to an unrelated person. 169 Second, compute the “credit percentage” of the facility by dividing the allocated capacity of the facility by that facility’s actual nameplate capacity. 170

If the aggregate nameplate capacity of all

facilities is less than or equal to the national limitation, then that facility’s credit percentage will
be 100%. 171 Finally, the credit allowed will be the lesser of (1) the tentative credit multiplied by
the credit percentage; or (2) $125 million per 1000 megawatts allocated to the facility. This approach can ultimately be distilled into two formulas: (1) the Maximum Annual Credit Limitation,
computed as follows: an amount not more than, ($125 million) x [(individual facility’s allocated
megawatt capacity limitation) / (1,000)]; (2) Credit Allocation, computed as follows: a combination of the credit percentage and the tentative credit provisions of Notice 2006-40, [(6,000 megawatt national limitation) / (aggregate nameplate capacity of all facilities)] x 1.8 cents per kWh.
Continuing with the prior example, the twenty-six facilities each operate at a nameplate
capacity of 1000 megawatts and receive a 230.769 megawatt capacity allocation. 172 Each facility
in the example would be permitted a 0.41538 cent credit for every kWh hour produced and sold
to an unrelated person, not to exceed $28.5 million per year for their first eight years of operation. 173

This amount is significantly lower than the value of the credit without such limita-

tions. 174 Nuclear would take a credit of .41538 cents/kWh of electricity produced and sold, not

169

Id. § 2.04(1).
Id. § 2.04(2).
171
See id. § 2.04(2), 3.03(1).
172
Computed from the National Megawatt Limitation formula.
173
Each facility’s annual credit allocation is determined as follows: [(6,000 national limitation) / (39,000 aggregate
nameplate capacities)] x 1.8 cents per kWh, or 0.2769 cents per kWh. The maximum annual credit amount is computed as follows: ($125 million) x [(230.769 individual allocated capacity) / (1,000)], or $28.85 million.
174
Had the limitations not applied, the facility would receive a credit in the amount of 1.8 cents per kWh produced
and sold, up to $187.5 million per year ($125 million x 1.5).
170
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to exceed a maximum of $28.5 million per year. As a result, Nuclear’s credit for its first year of
operations would be limited to a maximum of $28.5 million, despite totaling $33.8 million. 175
4. Phaseout Limitation
Section 45J provides a reference price phaseout of the credit that effectively reduces the
amount of the credit by the excess of the actual price at which the electricity is sold over the reference price determined by the Code. The phaseout limitation can be computed as a reduction of
the credit by one-third of the excess that the “reference price” exceeds eight (8) cents, adjusted
for inflation. 176

The “reference price” is defined as “the annual average contract price per kilo-

watt hour of electricity generated . . . and sold.”177 As of 2010, the eight-cent threshold price
was indexed at 1.4342, or 11.474 cents. 178

The § 45J phaseout limitation initially appears to

pose little risk of reducing the amount of the credit because the threshold price as inflated for
2010 exceeds the average cost of nuclear energy. 179 The 2010 average retail price for electricity
was 9.83 cents per kWh, about 1.6 cents below the indexed threshold amount. 180
While these figures are favorable, it bears emphasizing that not one of the 104 nuclear facilities currently operating in the U.S. qualifies for the § 45J production tax credit because each

175

Computed as follows: (8.1468 billion kilowatts produced in year 1) x (.41538 cents/kWh) = $33,840,553.85 total
credit for year 1.
176
26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(c)(2) (West 2012).
177
Id. § 45(e)(2)(C).
178
FEDERAL TAX COORDINAT OR 2D, FTC ¶ L-17762 (RIA 2012), available at 1997 WL 554216 (“The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Inflation Adjustment Factor for the Electricity Production Credit Rate and Threshold Price”);
see also Credit for Renewable Electricity Production, Refined Coal Production, and Indian Coal Production, and
Publication of Inflation Adjustment Factors and Reference Prices for Calendar Year 2010, I.R.S. Notice 2010-37,
2010-18 I.R.B. 654, available at 2010 WL 1738863 (providing the inflation adjustment for 2010 at 1.4342 factor).
Indexed Reference Price computed as follows: (1.4342) x ($0.08) = 11.474 cents.
179
According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, “the average production cost of” nuclear energy was 2.19 cents per
kWh in 2010.
Affordable Energy to Support Economic Growth, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST .,
http://nei.org/keyissues/reliableandaffordableenergy/economicgrowth/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). Similarly, the
Energy Information Administration reveals the 2010 average cost of nuclear energy was about 2.398 cents per kWh.
Comparatively, this is about 33% cheaper than coal and 50% cheaper than gas. Electric Power Annual 2010 Data
Table 8.2, U.S. ENERGY INFO. A DMIN. (Nov. 2011), available at http://205.254.135.7/electricity/annual/
pdf/table8.2.pdf.
180
Electric Power Annual 2010 Data Table 7.4, U.S. ENERGY INFO. A DMIN. (Nov. 2011), available at
http://205.254.135.7/electricity/annual/pdf/table7.4.pdf.
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was placed in service before the earliest period allowed by the EPA-2005. 181 It is futile to use
operating costs and sales from non-qualifying nuclear facilities currently producing electricity to
analyze the potential pitfalls of the phaseout limitation because the costs and revenues of the first
qualifying facility will likely be substantially higher.

Instead, it is necessary to predict the infla-

tion factor based on when the first new facility is likely to begin operations. The most conservative date for the inflation estimate would be January 1, 2021. 182 In 2021, the inflation factor can
be approximated by increasing the 2011 inflation factor by the preceding ten-year average increase, resulting in an inflation factor of 1.7959.

This will increase the eight-cent threshold

amount to 14.37 cents per kWh, 183 which may preclude a new nuclear facility from taking full
advantage of the production tax credit for that year, depending on projected costs and revenues. 184

If the indexed threshold price will be less than the projected average price per kWh,

there is an increased likelihood that § 45J(c)(2) would reduce or phase out the credit. 185 For Nuclear, this consideration would not be an issue, since it will charge 14.37 cents/kWh to its customers.

181

See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(d)(2) (West 2012) (requiring that a qualified nuclear facility must use a reactor design
“approved after December 31, 1993” by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission); see also id. § 45J(d)(1)(B) (requiring
the facility to be placed in service after August 8, 2005, but before January 1, 2021).
182
See id. § 45J(d)(1)(B) (requiring the facility to be placed in service before January 1, 2021).
183
From 2001 to 2011 the inflation factor increased approximately 24.21% from a factor of 1.1641 to 1.4459. FEDERAL TAX COORDINAT OR 2D, supra note 178, FTC ¶ L-17762.
184
Investors should first estimate the indexed threshold amount for the year in which they plan to begin operations;
then estimate their projected operating costs of the facility in that year; finally, estimate the projected average price
per kWh adjusted for inflation and future demand.
185
Similarly, if the indexed threshold amount is greater than the estimated average price per kWh, which in turn is
greater than the estimated operating costs per kWh, then the phaseout limitation is less likely to reduce or preclude
the amount of the credit.
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5. No Adjustment of Credit Amount for Inflation
Unlike other energy credits, the amount of 1.8 cent per kWh credit for advanced nuclear
facilities cannot be adjusted for inflation. 186
year.

Its value will ultimately reduce for each subsequent

If a modern facility were to complete construction and commence operations by the year

2021, it must take the value of the credit in 2005 year dollars. The kWh production credit will be
worth much less than it would have been if the amount were adjusted for inflation to mirror its
value in 2021 dollars. 187
Nuclear would generate a production tax credit in its first year of operations totaling
$28.5 million, and thereby reduce its tax liability to $150.8 million. 188 Now compare the same
facts adjusted for inflation. Had the credit amount and limitations been adjusted by the inflation
factor the values would have been much larger. Using the estimated inflation factor for 2021 of
1.7959 above, the credit should be 3.23 cents/kWh (instead of 1.8 cents/kWh), with a maximum
credit limitation of $224,487,500 per 1000 megawatts of nameplate capacity.

Under those cir-

cumstances, Nuclear would earn the credit at .74538 cents/kWh189 with a maximum credit allocation of $51.8 million. 190

Nuclear would generate a total credit of $60.7 million, 191 limited to

the adjusted $51.8 million maximum credit allocation for its first year of operations.

Nuclear’s

tax liability would be reduced to $127.5 million, lower than its tax liability of $150.8 million
186

Although § 45J lacks any provision to increase the rate of the credit by the inflation factor for the given taxable
year, a similar credit for electricity produced from certain renewable resources found in § 45 is adjusted for inflation. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 45(b)(2) (allowing for inflation adjustment on limitation amount of credit for electricity
produced from certain renewable sources).
187
Considering the high cost of building the plant, a modern facility must charge a sufficient amount to its customers
in order to cover its liabilities and expenses, and yet, turn a profit. The cost of electricity to consumers will logically
increase over the years alongside inflation, resulting in larger revenues to utility providers.
188
Computed as follows: ($179,338,528.25 pre-credit tax liability) – ($28.5 million production tax credit) =
$150,838,528.25 in total tax liability.
189
Computed as follows: [(6,000 megawatt national limitation)/(26,000 megawatt aggregate nameplate capacity)] x
(3.23 cents/kWh adjusted for inflation) = .74538 cents/kWh.
190
Computed as follows: ($224,487,500 adjusted credit allocation) x [(230.769 allocated nameplate capacity) /
(1,000 megawatts)] = $51,804,755.89 adjusted maximum credit allocation.
191
Computed as follows: (8.1468 billion kilowatts produced in year 1) x (.74538 cents/kWh adjusted for inflation) =
$60,724,617.84 total credit generated for year 1.
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when the credit is not adjusted for inflation. 192 With each subsequent year after 2005, 193 the potential value of the credit ultimately decreases because it is not adjusted for inflation.
D. Coordination of § 45J with the General Business Credit
The built-in limitations of § 45J, illustrated above, are not the only hurdles the taxpayer
must clear in claiming the production tax credit for advanced nuclear facilities.

After determin-

ing the amount of the § 45J tax credit, companies exercising the option must claim the credit pursuant to the provisions of the General Business Credit under I.R.C. § 38, 194 which further limits
the extent of the § 45J credit. 195
Congress permits business and profit-seeking taxpayers to utilize various credits as an incentive to encourage national economic expansion and development. 196

The taxpayer must

claim certain credits within the limits of § 38 of the Internal Revenue Code. 197 Section 38 permits application of a “general business credit” for the current taxable year. 198 The amount of the
general business credit includes, inter alia, “the advanced nuclear power facility production credit determined under § 45J(a).”199

Section 38 limits the aggregate allowance of the general busi-

ness credit to the excess “of the taxpayers’ ‘net tax liability’ for the year, less the greater of the
‘tentative minimum tax’ or 25 percent of ‘net regular tax liability’ in excess of $25,000.”200 The

192

Computed as follows: ($179,338,528.25 pre-credit tax liability) – ($51,804,755.89 adjusted maximum credit allocation) = $127,533,772.36 in tax liability.
193
The year Congress added § 45J to the code. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
194
26 U.S.C.A. § 38 (West 2012) (General Business Credit).
195
See infra note 201.
196
See World Airways, Inc. v. C.I.R., 564 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing the investment credit used to modernize and expand nation’s production capabilities).
197
26 U.S.C.A. § 38.
198
Id. § 38(a).
199
Id. § 38(b)(21).
200
BORIS I. BIT T KER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXAT ION OF INCOME, EST AT ES, AND GIFT S ¶ 27.1.2 (2011)
(“Business Credits-In General”). For a better understanding of the General Business Credit and how it works to
prevent excessive reduction of income for tax reporting purposes, see generally Id. ¶ 27.1. The exact details of interpreting and applying the business credit allowance limitation are exceedingly complex and beyond the scope of
this paper.
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taxpayer should be aware that § 38 may create latent problems related to the amount of the § 45J
credit claimed. 201
Section 45J allocates a production tax credit based on the energy output of a modern nuclear facility.
tricity.

It follows that the value of the credit increases as the facility produces more elec-

At the same time, more electricity produced and sold to customers results in larger reve-

nues; as those revenues increase, so too will the taxpayer’s overall tax liability. Since the effect
of the § 45J credit is a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the taxpayer’s tax liability, the credit will be
claimed against a portion of the taxpayer’s net taxes owed to the government for that year. Second, note that the limitations imposed by § 38(c), the general business credit, are essentially
based on percentages relating to taxable income—the “tentative minimum tax” and the “net regular tax liability.”202

Though a nuclear facility may produce enough electricity to reap the bene-

fit of a large production tax credit, the percentage-based limitation of the general business credit
may result in disallowance of a portion of that credit for any eligible § 45J-year. 203 However,
under current law this may not be the case.
There are sixteen completed § 45J-eligible applications for COLs proposing the construction of twenty-four modern nuclear facilities by 2021.
201

If all applicants successfully complete

The general business credit’s limitation of allowance references the “tentative minimum tax.” Id. § 38(c). The
tentative minimum tax is 20% of the alternative minimum taxable income “as exceeds the exemption amount” of
$40,000. 26 U.S.C.A. § 55(b)(1)(B)(i) (West 2012). This provision prevents the § 45J credit from offsetting any
amount calculated for the tentative minimum tax in the event that the taxpayers actual tax liability falls so low that
the taxpayer is forced to pay the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). Likewise, commentators note that if the tentative minimum tax for the company owning the nuclear facility is zero, then the maximum amount of the general
business credit is limited to “the first $25,000 of tax liability [plus] 75 percent of any remaining tax liability.”
BIT T KER & LOKKEN, supra note 200, ¶ 27.1.2. This is a tough break for new nuclear facilities capable of consistently operating around 90% of their nameplate capacity, even in the first year of operations.
202
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 38(c)(1); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 55 (West 2012) (stating that the tentative minimum tax is
20% of the alternative minimum taxable income “as exceeds the exemption amount” of $40,000).
203
Because the limitations of the general business credit reserves a minimum percentage of the net tax liability to go
untouched by the § 45J credit, § 38 may leave the taxpayer with a significant tax liability that would have otherwise
been reduced by the unused excess of the general business credit for that year. This potential problem is latent in
that there is no real way to determine if the limitation will apply until the taxpayer begins operations. For instance,
the tax liability could be large enough that the amount of the § 45J credit claimed fails to exceed the § 38 limitation.
In that instance, the full value of the § 45J credit will be claimed against the net tax liability.
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each project, the § 45J credit will be significantly limited for each facility.

It is therefore not

likely that the amount of the § 45J credit included in the computation of the general business
credit will exceed the § 38 limitation. Should Congress decide to amend § 45J, the chances of §
38 limiting the allowance of the credit will increase.
The credit is refundable under § 39 of the Code. 204 A taxpayer may recapture the amount
of the credit that exceeds the credit allowance permitted under § 38. The excess is carried back
to the preceding taxable year and carried forward twenty years, subject to the same limitations
under § 38(c) for each taxable year. 205 In calculating the general business credit for subsequent
years, the amount of the carryforward from the preceding year, if any, is applied first. Then the
amount of the credit for the current taxable year is determined and applied against the remaining
tax liability subject to the allowance limitations for “qualified business credits.”206
Generally, at the end of the twenty year carryforward period any unused portion of the
excess from the first year the general business credit to which the excess applies was calculated
in regard to the twenty year carryforward period will apply as a deduction—not a credit—in the
next taxable year to the extent that the unused excess consists of “qualified business credits” under § 196. 207 However, current law does not classify § 45J as a “qualified business credit” for
this purpose. 208 Thus, nuclear facilities that qualify for the nuclear production tax credit have the
opportunity to benefit from the full amount of the credit by applying the excess to subsequent
years for twenty years; however, they lose the benefit of a deduction of any expired amount at
the conclusion of that period.
E. Efficacy of § 45J
204

26 U.S.C.A. § 39(a).
Id.
206
26 U.S.C.A. § 196(a) (West 2012).
207
Id.
208
Id. § 196(c).
205
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The production tax credit will be too small of an incentive to have any real effect in persuading investors to spend significant sums of money to build modern nuclear reactors. Section
45J is severely limited on paper as well as in practice.

New facilities are likely to experience

their highest costs and liabilities in the first few years of operation. The benefits of the production tax credit will neither be significant enough to quell the industry’s concern of a looming
cloud of bankruptcy, nor substantial enough to assist in the payment of liabilities.
IV. Congress Should Change the Tax Structure to More Effectively Promote the Development of Modern Nuclear Power
Since 2009, there has been one application to build a new nuclear power plant. 209 Congress could change this and more appropriately give effect to the legislative purpose of the EPA2005 by providing tax incentives to expand and develop modern nuclear energy.

Section 45J

significantly benefits first-movers of modern nuclear energy but is fatally flawed by its limitations. 210

Congress and the President legislatively endorsed the clean energy movement by enact-

ing legislation subsidizing production from nuclear—and renewable—sources.
should be designed with that goal in mind.

These subsidies

Renewable energy sources are far from capable of

leading the clean air revolution, though not necessarily incapable.

Nuclear energy can help sig-

nificantly reduce carbon and greenhouse gas emissions in the near future, by creating an effective reduction in carbon-emissions from electricity production during the renewable energy expansion period. 211 A better approach, using different tax incentives, can spark the chain reaction
necessary to expand nuclear development.
A. Congress Should Amend § 45J

209

See Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications, supra note 35.
From 2007-2008, every new application for a nuclear reactor decreased the value of the credit pursuant to the national megawatt limitation. See infra Part III.C.2.
211
Discussed infra Part I.
210
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The industry cannot shoulder the potential burdens and risks associated with building,
operating, and dismantling a modern nuclear power plant.

Historically, construction costs ex-

ceed their projected figures. 212 Section 45J started off as an extremely valuable tax incentive but
because of its built-in limitations, every investor suffered as more interest in new plants grew.
These limitations inherently pit industry leaders against one another and deter future investment
by limiting the value of the credit for every new COL application received. The credit is unpredictable and limited to first-mover participation.

Congress should amend § 45J to allow each

new investor to take advantage of the full value of the credit.
B. Remove the Application Cutoff Date
Although, investors do not want to continue “with a cloud of bankruptcy hanging over
[their] head,”213 the bulk of federal support needed to go forward is no longer available to new
applicants.

Current applicants face a Hobson’s choice of either continuing with construction

knowing the value of the credit is a fraction of what it could have been, or ceasing all efforts and
losing the potential business opportunity.
eligibility under § 45J.

Therefore, Congress should remove the cutoff date for

This would allow new investors to enter the market and take advantage

of the production tax credit.

Likewise, removing the cutoff date would fulfill the legislative pur-

pose of clean energy tax credits, by increasing the amount of modern nuclear energy facilities,
and reducing the creation of new coal and natural gas operated facilities.
decrease the overall environmental impact of energy production.

This would ultimately

If Congress refuses to amend

the cutoff date, there will likely be no significant development of nuclear energy because future
applicants will not be eligible for the credit’s much needed subsidy.
C. Amend the National Megawatt Limitation

212
213

See DEUT CH ET AL., supra note 79, at 8.
Tomain, supra note 10.
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Removing the cutoff date would be the first step of many to make the credit a favorable
tax subsidy to future investors. However, under current law, if Congress were to permit new applicants to become eligible for the credit, the applicant pool would increase, causing the credit allocation to decrease for all other applicants. 214 It would also be necessary to contemporaneously
alter the national megawatt limitation to prevent a significant reduction of the credit available to
other applicants.
When Congress added § 45J to the Code, it intended to spend a maximum of $6 billion
and wanted to ensure that no matter how many applicants filed for COL, the credit would never
exceed this predetermined amount. 215

Recall that each qualifying facility may only claim the

credit for the first eight (8) years of operations. 216 Congress should remove the national megawatt limitation and instead reduce the credit based on each separate facility. This could be accomplished by providing that each facility will be permitted a maximum credit of $100 million
per year adjusted by the ratio which the reactor’s nameplate capacity bears to 1500 megawatts
for its first eight years of operations.

A nuclear power plant with a 1000 megawatt nameplate

capacity is eligible for a maximum yearly credit of $66.7 million and a 1500 megawatt reactor
would qualify for the full $100 million credit.

This approach benefits investors by allowing them

to know the amount of the credit before commencing operations.

Similarly, investors could be

sure that, as new applicants enter the market, the credit will not gradually lose its value.
D. Adjust the Credit Amount for Inflation
Congress added the production tax credit for advanced nuclear facilities to the Code in
2005. The amount of the credit contemplated at that time was subject to the value of the dollar in

214

The National Megawatt Limitation under § 45J reduces the credit allocation based on the aggregate nameplate
capacity of all other applicants. 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(b) (West 2012).
215
See Overview of § 45J, supra Part III.B.
216
See id.
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2005.

However, no adjustment for inflation is permitted for the 1.8 cent credit amount or maxi-

mum credit allowance.

It can take years for a nuclear facility to complete the application, con-

struction, and inspection phases before commencing operations.

In fact, Congress anticipated

this delay by requiring that the nuclear power plant begin construction before January 1, 2014. 217
If a modern nuclear facility commences operations before January 1, 2021, over fourteen years
after § 45J was added to the Code, it will take the value of the credit without the benefit of any
adjustment for inflation or, more fundamentally, it will take the value of the credit subject to the
value of the dollar in 2005.

Congress should permit inflation adjustments to the credit amount

and maximum credit allowance to ensure an equitable value of the credit each year a taxpayer
claims it.

Doing so allows investors to make an inflation adjustment to the eight-cent value of

the credit for every eligible year, thereby reducing any inherent loss in the time-value of the
credit.
E. Offer Non-Credit Tax Incentives
One beneficial tax incentive to modern nuclear power plants is the ability to deduct the
future costs of decommissioning the plant under § 468A. 218

Congress should consider offering

other non-credit tax incentives such as a reduction of the tax rate for income from operations for
a limited number of years after the nuclear power plant is placed in service. Most large electrical
utility companies will generate revenues in excess of $10 million, the minimum threshold for
imposition of the 35% tax rate on corporations. 219

217

Congress could reduce the tax rate for ad-

I.R.S. Notice 2006-40, supra note 155. Note that the nuclear power plant must also be placed in service after
August 8, 2005, but before January 1, 2021. 26 U.S.C.A. § 45J(d)(1)(B).
218
26 U.S.C.A. § 468A (West 2012).
219
26 U.S.C.A. § 11(b)(1)(D) (West 2012).
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vanced nuclear power plants to the next lower threshold of 34% 220 for the duration of time the
facility qualifies to take the production tax credit.
Conversely, Congress could elect to replace the § 45J credit altogether, and instead reduce the corporate tax rate for a limited period of time to each qualifying facility. For instance,
for the first eight years of operations, an advanced nuclear power plant would be taxed at a 25%
rate.

The benefit to investors would be the existence of a simple method of computing their tax

liability by applying the reduced percentage in lieu of making the complex calculations of the §
45J credit amount.

More significantly, a reduced tax rate would not pit the IRS and nuclear

power plants against each other. This is because a credit reduces the amount of tax the IRS receives based on the amount of electricity produced. As a result, the more revenue a nuclear plant
earns, the less tax it will pay under the credit systems approach. In contrast, a reduced tax rate
places the business interests of the nuclear power plant in line with the tax-revenue interests of
the IRS. Thus, as a nuclear power plant produces more revenue, its tax liability continues to increase, which ultimately confers a benefit on both the IRS and the nuclear power plant because
each will earn more income based on the performance of the plant. Since the reduced tax rate
would be limited in duration to eight years, normal corporate rates will eventually apply.
V. Conclusion
The increasing demand for electricity in the U.S. will require the construction of new energy plants.

Because of their price competitiveness, coal and natural gas power plants are more

likely to be built unless Congress creates effective incentives for investors to build nuclear power
plants.

As new coal and natural gas plants are built, the environment suffers an increase in car-

bon emissions released into the atmosphere, and more non-renewable natural resources are depleted. Nuclear energy is a safe, clean, and effective alternative. Renewable resource production
220

Id. § 11(b)(1)(C).
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of electricity is far from capable of matching the output of coal and natural gas anytime in the
near future. Nuclear energy can help to displace these more damaging alternatives in the near future while renewable energy continues to develop.

The EPA-2005 provides a significant step in

the right direction and evidences Congress’ willingness to subsidize nuclear energy.

Unfortu-

nately, the tax incentives created by the EPA-2005 are nominal and ineffective. Congress should
amend § 45J to provide a realistic tax subsidy for nuclear energy or amend its approach altogether.

With the right incentives, nuclear energy can develop and expand enough to significantly re-

duce carbon and greenhouse gas emissions while meeting the growing demand for electricity.
Without such subsidies, nuclear power cannot survive.
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